• The Conference Board's Consumer Confidence Index fell 1.4 points to 90.8 in July. This is the third consecutive month consumers grew less upbeat about current conditions in the United States (U.S.), the organisation said Tuesday, July 28, 2026.
• "Consumer confidence moderated slightly in July, continuing a general downward sloping trajectory since late 2021," Dana M. Peterson, chief economist at The Conference Board, said in a statement. "Consumer appraisals of current business conditions and, to a lesser extent, perceptions of the current labour market both softened."
• The survey period ran July 1–22, encompassing ongoing conflict in the Middle East. The Conference Board noted that mentions of war, geopolitics, and conflict eased during the sample period, though recent reacceleration of fighting could lift such references in revised data. References to food and grocery prices increased in frequency.
• Consumers' assessment of current business and labour-market conditions fell by 3.6 points to 114.9. Meanwhile, the expectations index, based on short-term outlook for income, business and labour market conditions, remained unchanged at 74.7. The Conference Board said perceptions of employment conditions declined, with the labour market differential - the share of consumers saying jobs are "plentiful" minus the share saying jobs are "hard to get" - ticking down to 3.1%. Economists watch this labour-market differential to gauge how tight labour conditions are for households.
• July’s reading came after consumer confidence ticked up modestly in June to 91.2 as falling oil prices offered some relief from inflation concerns, though that reading fell short of economist forecasts. Before June, confidence reversed course in May, when rising energy costs tied to the Middle East conflict weighed on Americans' assessment of current conditions.
• Looking ahead, consumers grew less optimistic about business conditions over the next six months, with net expectations for business conditions dipping to -3.3%. That said, expectations for labour market conditions improved slightly but remained in negative territory.

(Sources: Yahoo Finance & MorningStar)

• Jamaica’s bauxite and alumina export earnings are forecast at US$760.0Mn in 2026, a 24% rebound from US$612.3Mn in 2025. However, the projection remains roughly US$43.0Mn below the 2024 peak of US$803.4Mn, confirming a recovery phase rather than a return to prior strength.
• The 2025 decline of US$191.1Mn, or 23.8%, reflected a combination of weaker prices and lower volumes. Alumina earnings fell to US$546.3Mn as the average realised price dropped to US$385.50 per tonne and export volumes declined by about 9% to 1.42Mn tonnes. By contrast, crude bauxite earnings rose 18% to US$66.0Mn on a 16.7% price gain to US$38.20 per tonne, underscoring that the two products are priced through different mechanisms and serve different buyers.
• Total bauxite production fell 4.4% to about 5.62Mn tonnes in 2025. This drop was driven by Hurricane Melissa, operational setbacks at refineries, and prolonged facility repairs. Earnings of approximately US$512.52Mn had been accumulated through the first three quarters, broadly flat against the same period of 2024. This indicates that the full-year shortfall was concentrated in H2 and that the sector entered 2026 already trending weaker.
• Hurricane Melissa cut Q1 2026 output sharply. Alumina production fell 30.3% year-on-year to 267,060 tonnes, while crude bauxite production declined 26.4% to 415,143 tonnes. These were among the steepest single-quarter contractions in Jamaica’s recent mining history.
• Q1 2026 exports held up somewhat better, supported by inventory drawdowns and pre-existing shipment commitments. Alumina exports declined about 10.7% to 319,600 tonnes from 358,070 tonnes, while crude bauxite exports fell about 29.7% to 384,276 tonnes.
• Repair and rehabilitation work at mining and processing facilities is expected to continue throughout 2026. Bauxite production is targeted at approximately 6.4Mn tonnes for the full year, a 14% increase on 2025. Given the Q1 deficit already recorded, most of that recovery would need to materialise in H2.
• The US$760.0Mn projection is a government forecast based on several assumptions. These include hurricane-damaged infrastructure returning to capacity on schedule, alumina prices recovering from cyclically weak 2025 levels, export volumes rebounding toward 2024 levels, and no further weather, shipping, or geopolitical disruptions. If prices rise 10% to 15% above the 2025 average and output reaches 6.4Mn tonnes, the target is achievable. However, the margin for execution error across Q2 to Q4 is narrow.
• Upside could come from tighter global alumina supply, faster repair completion, Asian smelters diversifying procurement, and a recovery in London Metal Exchange aluminium prices. Downside risks include repair timelines slipping deeper into H2, continued alumina price softness in an oversupplied market, further Atlantic hurricane season events, and adverse currency or freight cost movements.
• Alumina is priced mainly through bilateral contracts set as a percentage of the prevailing LME aluminium price, historically around 12% to 20%. A compression of that ratio squeezes margins without any change in volumes. Conversely, earnings can recover on pricing normalisation alone, even without higher output.
• Jamaica competes on quality rather than scale against Guinea, Australia, and Brazil, which dominate world bauxite trade. Its gibbsite-type ore requires less refining energy than boehmite-dominant ores, while its low reactive silica content reduces caustic soda consumption in Bayer process refining. Proximity to refiners in the eastern US and parts of Europe also lowers shipping costs.

(Source: Discovery Alert & Jamaica Bauxite Institute)

• Guyana is among 60 trading partners hit with a new 12.5% US tariff after the Trump administration imposed fresh duties on countries it says have failed to enforce bans on goods produced with forced labour adequately. The measures took effect as the temporary 10% global tariff expired on Friday, July 24, 2026.
• The development comes after Guyana cut ties with Cuba under a decades-old medical programme following Washington’s concerns about forced labour. Guyanese exports were nevertheless placed in the higher tariff category under the new action.
• The duties were imposed under Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, following the US Supreme Court’s decision in February to strike down Trump’s previous “reciprocal” tariffs of 10% to 50%. Section 301 has survived previous court challenges and may provide the administration with a more durable legal basis for maintaining the tariffs.
• Guyana was among 38 countries assigned the higher 12.5% rate. Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and several other economies received the lower 10% rate. Meanwhile, the European Union and several Asian economies were assigned rates that totalled 10% or 12.5% when combined with existing tariffs.
• The measures cover countries accounting for approximately 99.4% of US imports, although numerous products are exempt. These include oil and gas, fertiliser, certain food products, aircraft and parts, critical minerals and goods already subject to Section 232 tariffs, such as autos, steel, aluminium and copper.
• Several trading partners protested the action, describing the forced-labour justification as unfounded or unjustified. However, US officials argued that the country enforces stronger restrictions on forced-labour imports than its trading partners. They also said the tariffs respond to bipartisan calls to eliminate forced labour from global supply chains.
• The exemption for oil and gas should limit the direct impact on Guyana’s dominant petroleum exports. However, non-oil exports to the United States will face the higher 12.5% duty.

(Source: Kaieteur News)

• The Panama Canal expects revenue to exceed its US$5.2Bn forecast for fiscal 2026. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz drove more vessels through the waterway, while higher auction payments from ships seeking to skip the queue also supported revenue.

• Liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers flocked to the canal as buyers in Japan, China and South Korea turned to US suppliers to replace Middle Eastern producers affected by the war in Iran, including Qatar. Traffic from oil tankers carrying US crude to Asia also increased.
• At the peak of the Hormuz closure, the canal handled approximately 40 to 41 ships per day, compared with the normal 34 to 35 vessels. In April, one ship paid an additional US$4Mn to move to the front of the queue as waiting times increased for vessels without bookings.
• Traffic has since eased to approximately 36 to 38 vessels per day. However, bookings for June and July were strong, and the canal continues to handle an average of one LNG tanker per day even after an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
• Incoming administrator Ilya Espino de Marotta will take control of the canal in September and serve until 2033. She will oversee an approximately US$8.5Bn investment programme, including a new dam and reservoir, two port terminals and an LPG pipeline.
• The Hormuz closure reinforced the Panama Canal’s importance as a route for US energy exports to Asia, as buyers sought alternatives to affected Middle Eastern suppliers. Although daily transits have eased from their peak, strong bookings for June and July and the continued passage of LNG tankers are providing further support to revenue.

(Source: Newsroom Panama)

• A period of relative calm over the weekend reinforced BMI’s current base case of Messy Negotiations for the United States (U.S.)-Iran conflict, although the underlying factors that prompted it to increase the probability of escalation from 25% to 35% remain in place. After two weeks of U.S. bombing, Iranian retaliation against Gulf countries, and renewed disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Washington and Tehran have entered a de facto ceasefire¹ since July 24. The White House has messaged that the U.S. has halted its bombing campaign for the time being, and Iran has communicated that it will pause retaliatory strikes so long as the halt in U.S. bombing holds.
• BMI has long highlighted political, economic and operational factors that will constrain the U.S.’s appetite for a sustained re-escalation. The U.S. has attributed the pause to the effectiveness of its campaign in stopping Iranian disruption of shipping, but the agency suspects a more important factor is concern over both defensive and offensive weapons shortages. Moreover, claims that Iran's ability to disrupt shipping has been significantly degraded are difficult to assess given the low level of traffic through the Strait; recent shipping data suggests 29 vessels transited Hormuz between 24-26 July, many of them Iranian-linked.
• One important signal to monitor in the coming days is whether greater clarity emerges on the future of Hormuz. For the agency to be more confident that events are moving through its ‘Messy Negotiations’ scenario and towards a new U.S.-Iran understanding, one of two outcomes would be needed: either a) the U.S. accepts some form of Iranian oversight over the southern Hormuz route, with or without a regional consortium, or b) Iran concedes a southern transit corridor that does not require its coordination. According to BMI, outcome (A) appears more likely.
• The Strait remains Iran’s most important source of leverage over both the U.S. and its Gulf neighbours, and BMI suspects Tehran will seek some degree of control over shipping throughout any future nuclear negotiations. However, the regime will be reluctant to move too quickly, preferring to prolong its unilateral leverage over Hormuz to maximise concessions from Washington. That said, it is possible that Iran could accept a version of (B), at least initially, if it judges that lingering security risks would still deter use of the southern corridor and channel most traffic through routes it prefers.
• From the U.S. perspective, reopening Hormuz by force would be costly. Iran can disrupt shipping relatively cheaply with drones, while sustaining military operations at the intensity seen over the past two weeks would continue to deplete U.S. stockpiles without necessarily bringing Washington closer to its preferred outcome. Against this backdrop, wider Gulf participation in a future Hormuz framework, facilitated by Oman, could offer Trump a face-saving compromise while still meeting Iran’s criteria for some degree of oversight.
• That being said, the risk of a shift to an escalatory scenario remains higher than it was earlier in July. Washington’s recent re-deployment of personnel and equipment to the region gives President Trump the ability to escalate at short notice. If reports of degraded US air defences are accurate, even relatively limited Iranian strikes could result in US casualties, increasing pressure for an escalatory response. There is also an ongoing risk that either side misjudges the other’s red lines, triggering a broader escalation.

________________________

¹A de facto ceasefire is an unofficial halt to fighting that happens in practice without a formal peace treaty or written agreement.

(Source: BMI, A Fitch Solutions Company)

• United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump's push to end Washington's reliance on Chinese critical minerals by January is colliding with a stark reality: American miners and processors aren't ready. Trump has made U.S. mining and processing of critical minerals a national security priority since returning to office, pouring tens of billions of dollars into nearly 150 minerals companies to loosen China's grip on supply chains for weapons and other strategic products.
• The defence industry and other manufacturers are now just over five months away from a January 1, 2027, deadline under federal regulations to ‌stop purchasing rare earths, magnets, tungsten, molybdenum and tantalum from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea. Washington has been trying to limit such imports for years but has routinely granted companies waivers because the U.S. supply can't meet the demand.
• Trump railed against such waivers in a May 10 post on his Truth Social platform, saying: "ALL FEDERAL AGENCIES MUST BUY AMERICAN — NO EXCUSES!" Last Monday, July 20, 2026, he signed an executive order making it even harder for defence contractors to obtain waivers. But the reality is that U.S. minerals companies are nowhere close to meeting domestic needs, according to interviews with 16 industry executives, investors, analysts and policymakers.
• In 2025, U.S. demand for the most-common type of rare earth magnet, for example, was roughly 48,000 metric tons while domestic sources supplied 300 metric tons, according to data from the Arthur D. Little consultancy. U.S. firms are on track to have the capacity to produce 5,000 metric tons by year-end.
• Rare earths, which are among the 60 minerals considered critical by Washington, must be processed before they are turned into magnets used to make weapons, automobiles, computers and other products. U.S. firms haven't produced tungsten since 2015 and ⁠tantalum since 1959. Guardian Metal Resources is working to open a U.S. tungsten mine by 2028, while Lion Rock Resources is developing a tantalum mine in South Dakota, with no timeline for opening.
• Chris Berry, a minerals industry analyst and consultant, said the U.S. industry has little chance of producing enough minerals to end waivers by January. "It's going to take many more years to get the needed infrastructure in the ground to compete," said Berry. The United States has reserves of most critical minerals; what it lacks is the capacity to mine and process many of them.
• China grew to dominate the minerals-refining industry in the late 20th century and controls more than 80% of the sector today. The International Energy Agency warned this month that $6.5Tn of global manufacturing is at risk if Beijing imposes export restrictions on rare earths, as it has periodically in recent years.
• Asked for comment, the White House referred to Trump's executive order, which says waivers can only be issued if a contractor shows an "exhaustive effort" to avoid Chinese material and has a timeline for weaning itself off such supply. The Pentagon did not respond to requests for comment.

(Sources: Reuters)

• For April 2026, net remittance inflows to Jamaica declined by 0.8% year-over-year to US$274.5Mn, according to the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ). The decrease reflected a 0.5% (US$1.4Mn) reduction in total remittance inflows, compounded by a 5.1% (US$1.0Mn) increase in remittance outflows. The decline in inflows was mainly due to lower receipts through the Other Remittances channel^[1], partly offset by stronger inflows via remittance companies.
• The United States (U.S.) remained the largest source market for remittances, accounting for 68.8% of total inflows, unchanged from April 2025. Other key source markets were the United Kingdom (11.1%), Canada (8.5%), and the Cayman Islands (6.4%).
• That said, Year to date (January–April 2026), net remittance inflows have increased by 3.3% to US$1.07Bn, supported by a 3.2% (US$35.6Mn) rise in total remittance inflows, despite a 1.7% (US$1.3Mn) increase in remittance outflows. Total remittance inflows for the same period amounted to US$1.15Bn, representing a 3.2% increase relative to the corresponding period of 2025, highlighting continued resilience in remittance receipts despite the slight decline recorded in April.
• Compared with regional peers, Jamaica’s 3.2% growth in remittance inflows trailed Guatemala (10.5%) and El Salvador (7.2%) but exceeded Mexico’s 2.2% increase over the January–April 2026 period.
• Looking ahead, the BOJ expects remittance inflows to remain supportive over the medium term, underpinned by continued digital adoption, enhanced payment infrastructure, and diversified remittance channels. This should help support Jamaica's current account balance, even as the merchandise trade deficit is expected to widen due to higher imports associated with hurricane recovery efforts.
• However, there are downside risks, including a gradual slowdown in U.S. economic growth and easing labour market conditions, which could temper migrant income growth and, consequently, remittance inflows.

(Sources: Bank of Jamaica & NCBCM Research)

^[1] ‘Other Remittances’ refers to any remittance activity occurring outside of traditional remittance companies, for example transfers via deposit taking institutions.

• HDF Energy, a French renewable energy company, has acquired land in Jamaica to develop a utility-scale solar, hydrogen, and battery storage project that will support the country's clean energy transition.
• The proposed facility is expected to include more than 160 MW of solar generation, integrated with battery and hydrogen storage to provide reliable electricity, including during non-daylight hours.
• HDF Energy has launched preliminary environmental and social assessments to evaluate the project's environmental impact and potential connection to Jamaica's electricity grid. The project location has not yet been disclosed.
• The company is inviting expressions of interest from qualified organisations for financing, construction, operations, and other project roles to identify potential partners for future development phases.
• The project supports Jamaica's target of generating 50% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030 and aligns with HDF Energy's broader renewable energy expansion across the Caribbean.
• While the project remains in the early planning stage and is not yet a formal procurement process, it could position HDF Energy to participate in future renewable energy tenders as Jamaica expands its clean energy market
• The development, one of the largest renewable energy projects proposed in Jamaica to date, would significantly accelerate the country’s push toward its 50% clean energy goal by 2030 through the addition of over 160 MW of peak solar capacity. More broadly, it promises to elevate the national dialogue on lowering electricity costs, stabilising the power grid, and reducing Jamaica's long-term reliance on expensive imported fossil fuels.

(Sources: AdvanceH2 & NCBCM Research)

• The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump announced Thursday that it will impose a 12.5% tariff on imports from the Dominican Republic, part of a broader trade action affecting 60 countries and economies over what Washington says are insufficient efforts to combat forced labour.
• The new duty, announced by U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, will replace the temporary 10% global tariff that expires Friday, marking the latest escalation of the Trump administration’s trade policy.
• According to the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, the tariffs follow investigations launched in March under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act, which examined whether the affected countries’ policies related to preventing imports made with forced labour harmed U.S. workers and businesses.
• In Latin America, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador will face a 10% tariff, while Costa Rica, Panama, and the Dominican Republic will be subject to a 12.5% duty. Tariff rates for other countries vary depending on the product and country of origin.
• The administration said the investigations concluded that the identified practices justified new trade measures. The move comes after the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated most of Trump’s previous global tariffs, prompting the White House to rely on Section 301 as the legal basis for imposing new import duties.
• The latest tariffs are part of Trump’s broader trade agenda since returning to office in January 2025, using targeted measures to reshape U.S. trade policy and increase pressure on trading partners.

(Source: Dominican Today)

• Oil prices settled above US$100 per barrel on Thursday, July 23, 2026, for the first time since May. The increase followed Houthi attacks on two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea, worsening global supply disruptions after a near-halt in trade through the Strait of Hormuz.
• Brent futures finished up US$6.62, or 7.0%, at US$100.69 per barrel, marking their highest close since May 22, 2026. The global crude oil benchmark is now nearly 40% higher than when the Iran war began in February, with almost all of its gains coming this month.
• U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude closed up US$5.36, or 6.2%, at US$92.19 per barrel, its highest close since June 4. The rise reflects mounting concerns over restricted tanker traffic and the rapid drawdown of global oil supplies.
• Yemen’s Houthis have opened a new front in the Iran war by targeting vessels carrying Saudi oil through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait after announcing a naval blockade on shipments from Saudi Arabia. The group said it attacked two Saudi tankers, while Saudi Arabia confirmed that one vessel was ablaze following an assault in the Red Sea.
• Iranian attacks on vessels crossing the strait and the reintroduction of a U.S. naval blockade targeting Iranian ports have sharply reduced oil traffic. Iranian oil loadings have likely fallen to zero from 1.5 million–2.0 million barrels per day at the start of July, while Gulf loading activity declined to 2.5 million barrels per day over the past seven days, compared with 6.0 million barrels per day over the previous 30 days.
• Analysts estimate that the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb carry the equivalent of roughly one-quarter of the global oil supply. According to Goldman Sachs, Brent could exceed US$120 per barrel in the fourth quarter and average US$100 in 2027 if the Strait of Hormuz remains disrupted, with further upside if the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Suez Canal also experience persistent disruptions.

(Source: Reuters)